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1. Introduction. 
 
Article 3(5) TEU 
 
The European Union (EU) now has a new Treaty provision to guide international 
relations; 
 
In its relations with the wider world, the Union shall uphold and promote its 
values and interests and contribute to the protection of its citizens. It shall 
contribute to peace, security, the sustainable development of the Earth, 
solidarity and mutual respect among peoples, free and fair trade, eradication of 
poverty and the protection of human rights, in particular the rights of the child, 
as well as to the strict observance and development of international law, 
including respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter.
1
 
 
It is necessary to cite the article in full in order to appreciate the remarkable breadth of 
aims contained therein. The more modern concepts of sustainable development and 
protection of human rights have certainly become well established centre-pieces of 
the internal EU legal structure. Some progress has undoubtedly been made at an 
international level in these areas also. However, recent instances have marked a 
dichotomy between EU values (and law) and their international counterparts. In the 
case of Kadi
2
 the European Court of Justice (ECJ) annulled a Community Regulation 
which incorporated verbatim a Security Council Resolution. It proved a controversial 
decision or, at least, divided scholarly opinion and generated much comment. The 
ECJ has been criticised for „withdrawing into one‟s own constitutional cocoon, 
isolating the international context‟3 and simultaneously praised for creating „an 
incentive for the further development and improvement of international law‟.4 
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Whatever form of reasoning one adopts to justify or criticise the decision, it is 
undeniable that the dichotomy between EU values and international provisions gave 
rise to the need for judgement. And this shall not change in the immediate future; 
meaning that the uneasy application of international law in the European Union may 
need to be reconsidered. Article 3(5) TEU appears to appreciate this friction and calls 
for a balance to be struck.  
 
2. The Case. 
 
The case of Air Transport Association (and others) v Secretary of State for Energy 
and Climate Change
5
,  questioning whether Directive 2008/101 breaches international 
law, is currently referred from London to the European Court of Justice (ECJ) for a 
preliminary ruling. Directive 2008/101 incorporates international commercial airline 
emissions into the European emission trading scheme which has been operating since 
2004.
6
 Becoming fully operational in January of 2012, it currently only imposes 
obligations on airlines to report emissions statistics.
7
 The Directive provides that „all 
flights which arrive at or depart from an aerodrome situated in the territory of a 
Member State to which the Treaty applies shall be included.‟8 The obligation on 
aircraft operators to provide credits (measured in tonne-kilometers) for emissions 
shall be calculated by the formula „tonne-kilometres = distance x payload‟, where 
distance „means the great circle distance between the aerodrome of departure and 
arrival plus an additional fixed factor of 95km‟.9 It becomes immediately clear from 
the above text that the Directive applies irrespective of airline nationality, and that 
there appear to be extraterritorial effects. For example, in applying the formula for 
tonne-kilometres to a flight from New York to London one can see that emissions 
over the US and international waters are being covered in addition to those over the 
EU.  
The Chicago Convention provides that: 
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 The contracting States recognize that every State has complete and exclusive 
jurisdiction over the airspace above its territory.
10
 
 
The Directive appears irresolvable with the above provision and what could arguably 
be a fundamental principle of customary international law; the sovereignty of a state 
over its own territory. Coincidentally airspace over international waters has been 
expressly reserved for the ICAO itself
11
, meaning that collectively the Member States 
of the EU may only regulate within their collective jurisdiction.  
 
An alternative characterisation, desired by environmental organisations in the referral, 
of Directive 2008/101 would be that rather than attempting to govern emissions 
within other States‟ jurisdictions, the obligation to (conceptually) proffer allowances 
is a prerequisite for entry to EU airspace and unconnected with geography.
12
 Article 
15, however, provides that: 
 
No fees, dues or other charges shall be imposed by any contracting State in 
respect solely of the right of transit over or entry into or exit from its territory 
of any aircraft of a contracting State or persons or property thereon. 
 
The EU Directive, being unconnected with airport usage itself, is destined to breach 
this particular Article by becoming a charge connected only with transit. 
 
It seems true then that substantive analysis and strict application would likely reach 
the conclusion of illegality. But the case of Intertanko
13
 recently displayed the 
difficulties in relying on international Treaty provisions when moving for invalidation 
of EU legislation. In that case the EU were party to one of the relevant Conventions, 
here that is not the case. However, Article 1 of the Chicago Convention is very likely 
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to have crystallised (or already been in 1944
14
) customary international law, and is 
thus binding on the EU without the need for it to be party to the Convention.
15
 
 
 
Treaty law at the European Level 
 
The EU is not a party to the Chicago Convention, although all of its Member States 
are.
16
 This means that, unlike an agreement concluded by the EU, the Convention is 
not binding on all EU institutions. The Convention is of a date prior to 1 January 1958 
and as such the transitional provision is applicable: 
 
To the extent that such agreements are not compatible with the Treaties, the 
Member State or States shall take all appropriate steps to eliminate the 
incompatibilities established…17  
 
 
This requires Member States to renegotiate, and „all appropriate steps‟ ultimately 
requires, in lieu of successful renegotiation, Member States to denounce such 
agreements where international law permits.
18
 This requirement has already taken 
effect in the field of separate international bilateral airline agreements in several 
cases; all of which ultimately required renegotiation with the US, although in those 
cases the agreements were held to have been concluded after accession.
19
  The case of 
Commission v Portugal
20
 showed this renegotiation to be an obligation of ends rather 
than means, and it has been observed that the „margin of action left to the states is 
thus very narrow‟.21 Clearly it is broadly undesirable for the EU to either pass, or for 
the ECJ to frequently uphold, legislation which places Member States in such an 
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undesirable position. To this end it is interesting to note the EU declaration of 
reservation to the ICAO in which it claims that Directive 2008/101 is compliant with 
the Chicago Convention. The sentiment being that the Convention, to the EU‟s mind, 
need not be renegotiated. Whilst such a statement could not bind the ECJ it would 
also be unimaginable for the Court to require Member States to renegotiate or even 
denounce the Chicago Convention on both political and practical levels as it is a 
remarkably important multi-lateral Treaty, unlike in the case law above.
22
 The case 
law equally has never suggested that the EU should review its legislation where 
renegotiation is not possible, leaving us on somewhat uncertain ground in this case. 
 
The Chicago Convention‟s continued presence seemingly assured, it becomes 
necessary to analyse what impact the Convention can have on EU law. The “open-
skies” cases suggest that the EU has not acquired all competences which the Member 
States possessed in the field of air transport.
23
 „In the absence of a full transfer of the 
powers previously exercised by the Member States‟24 the Community cannot be 
bound by Conventions which only Member States are party to, that is so regardless of 
the fact that all Member States are party to the Chicago Convention. The ECJ 
expressly stated that such a Convention cannot call into question the validity of a 
Directive, however: 
  
In view of the customary principle of good faith, which forms part of general 
international law, and of Article 10 EC, it is incumbent upon the Court to 
interpret those provisions taking account of [the Convention].
25
 
 
This, rather vague, statement proved to be the end of the analysis on this matter within 
the Intertanko judgement. How this „interpretation‟ should be given effect was not 
discussed, and the possibility of irresolvable differences seemingly not contemplated. 
Moreover, of relevance for the current referral, the case law suggests that where the 
EU is not party to a Member State agreement and is providing a preliminary ruling it 
is for the national Court, and not the ECJ, to interpret the extent of international 
                                                 
22
 P Eeckhout External Relations of the European Union, (OUP, 2005), p 342. 
23
 Ibid, p336. 
24
 Intertanko (N 13 above) paragraph 49. 
25
 Ibid paragraph 52. 
obligations.
26
 In this regard the Chicago Convention does broadly appear largely 
unequivocal and precise as to the extent of party obligations. However, given the 
reluctance shown by the ECJ to engage in any such analysis in Intertanko, where it 
was well placed to do so, such guidance in the present case appears markedly unlikely 
The concluding discourse appears to be one of, at best, (extremely) muted 
interpretation in light of international law and, at worst, mere lip-service to 
international obligations. Where the ECJ does not undertake this interpretation it is 
noted that, upon return, domestic courts are faced with the Supremacy of EU law and 
therefore must apply the Directive. If this clashes with international obligations the 
court would presumably endeavour to find a fit by manipulating international 
provisions, so as to do achieve judicially what Article 351 TFEU ideally requires 
politically. But theoretical analysis reveals something of a repetitive cycle, comprising 
international law (presumably) incorporated into a domestic legal system, Supremacy 
of EU Law and the provision of Article 351 TFEU that it is not to affect „rights and 
obligations‟ under international law. 
 
 
Customary International Law at the European Level 
 
Given the weak prospect of success in proceeding by reliance on Treaty law, it is 
notable that the question referred to the ECJ expressly asks about compliance with 
customary international law provisions also. Generally in international law where a 
state is not party to a Treaty it may nonetheless become bound by equivalent 
provisions where those provisions have separately crystallised into customary 
international law. The ECJ has been receptive of this when applicants have sought to 
rely on such provisions to review EU legislation. As noted above, this was clearly 
why any extraterritorial elements were sought to be downplayed greatly by 
environmental organisations when the referral of the question was made. In Poulsen 
the ECJ considered that fishing legislation should indeed be interpreted to give „the 
greatest practical effect‟ of the aims of the EU legislation, but crucially that this 
would be conducted „within the limits of international law‟.27 The ECJ then proceeded 
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with this analysis and gave guidance on relevant points of the Regulation.
28
 As noted 
above, Intertanko implies the ECJ is now reluctant to partake in such analysis and 
merely stated the principle in that case. Interpretation not being conducted, the 
remaining hope for the applicants in our case would be for the court to find the 
Directive unlawful due to a breach of general international law. But it has been noted 
that, even in the progressive case of Poulsen, the ECJ may not have anticipated ease 
of step from questions of interpretation to questions of unlawfulness,
29
 and Intertanko 
appears only to render any such a step all the wider.   
 
In Intertanko it was noted that the Marpol Convention had not codified any general 
international law.
30
 UNCLOS clearly may contain many crystallised principles of 
general international law, however, the EU is party to that Convention and the focus 
of the Court then shifted to questioning the presence of direct effect. The outcome of 
the analysis being that: 
 
UNCLOS does not establish rules intended to apply directly and immediately 
to individuals and to confer upon them rights or freedoms capable of being 
relied upon against States, irrespective of the attitude of the ship‟s flag State.31  
 
This was so in spite of the fact that „wording of certain provisions of UNCLOS, such 
as Articles 17, 110(3) and 111(8), appears to attach rights to ships‟32, and „the fact that 
Part XI of UNCLOS involves natural and legal persons in the exploration of the sea-
bed‟.33 It appears then that an investigation into the „nature and the broad logic, as 
disclosed in particular by its aim, preamble and terms…‟ affords much discretion for 
the Court to ultimately „preclude examination of the validity of Community measures 
in the light of its provisions‟.34 
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This approach, and conclusion, has been questioned as a possible „watershed 
moment‟35; in that it may mark a departure from the previously more commonly held 
conception that one „certainly not conclude that that the EU legal order is hostile 
towards international law.‟36 But a broader incorporation of the WTO approach 
(presuming a lack of direct effect), which had been considered the exception,
37
  raises 
some questions. The ultimate consequence is undoubtedly less immense pressure on 
the EU to respect the provisions of the UNCLOS or any other similar provisions be 
they binding or customary. This trend shall likely continue in ATA v SoS. For the 
reason that it would be something of an absurdity were the Court to welcome 
international provisions not  binding on the EU but crystallising general rules, whilst 
simultaneously (as with UNCLOS in Intertanko) deploying direct effect hurdles to 
preclude application of a Treaty which crystallises such rules and forms an integral 
part of the EU legal system. The prospect of the Directive being declared invalid, or 
indeed even being interpreted, in light of international law consequently appears 
highly improbable. 
 
 
3. Comment. 
 
 
Reasonableness 
 
The EU arguably gathers much traction politically through the reasonableness of its 
legislation rather than the strength of its legal position. For it is immediately 
noticeable that the parties that shall suffer most financial hardship under the 
provisions will be EU carriers; as their flights shall always depart from or arrive at an 
EU aerodrome. It has also been noted that conversely governments in the Gulf are 
increasingly supportive of their domestic carriers, and that EU airlines are concerned 
by this factor, particularly when coupled with the prospective effects of Directive 
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2008/101.
38
 Furthermore, commentators have stated that even where long-haul flights 
of non-EU origin are covered by the scheme the superior efficiencies of larger aircraft 
shall mitigate expense. This means that the spoke part of a “hub-and-spoke” operation 
is far more fuel efficient than the shorter flights to the hub. That an EU airlines‟ hub 
operation is included in addition to its long-haul counterpart is thus not merely a 
disadvantage, but an exponential one. To complete EU business complaints, concern 
has been expressed that even EU airports could lose traffic; as US carriers may use 
airports in the Gulf to link flights to the large Asia market in order to avoid charges on 
even their efficient long-haul flights.
39
 The selflessness of the provisions are 
unquestionable; nobody shall be more hurt than the EU (businesses).  
 
The Standard Internal Approach 
 
The ECJ adopts a teleological approach in its internal judgements and this inevitably 
allows the court discretion in interpretation. The above analysis displays conversely 
that in questioning direct effect of international Treaties and general law there are 
many technical issues which appear. Once these have been overcome the applicant is, 
in principle, entitled to have the legislation which contradicts with the international 
provision declared void or, at least, reinterpreted. The case at hand deals with 
environmental protection on an incredible scale. Directive 2008/101 shall form part of 
the EU‟s greatly developed environmental policy in which emissions trading has been 
termed by the European Parliament as „the cornerstone‟.40 Environmental legislation 
has been passed at an increasing rate, and the EU is now into its sixth Environmental 
Action Programme.
41
 The exponential growth of environmental issues, which now 
must be incorporated in every EU measure by virtue of Article 11 TFEU, owes much 
to the ECJ itself.  
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The court has proved willing to uphold measures to protect the environment, even to 
the detriment of Free Movement provisions.
42
 These “Four Fundamental Freedoms” 
are at the very core of the EU and have historically been fiercely protected by the 
ECJ. Distinctly applicable measures adopted by Member States discriminate on 
grounds of nationality and, as such, strike at the very notions of an internal market.  
As such they can only be saved through recourse the narrow Article 36 TFEU 
derogations.
43
 PrussenElektra
44
, however, may prove that environmental protection 
can also be invoked to justify a discriminatory measure. The provision required 
purchasers of electricity to acquire a certain amount from renewable sources. The 
court did not determine whether the measure was distinctly or indistinctly applicable 
although it appeared to be the former. The court, stated, somewhat unconvincingly 
„that that [State] policy is also designed to protect the health and life of humans, 
animals and plants‟45; grounds which are contained in Article 36. It went on to note 
that the internal market for electricity was not yet fully liberalised. And furthermore, 
that it is difficult to determine the origin of electricity once within a distribution 
system „and the source of energy from which it was produced‟46, and finally that a 
certification system was required at EU level before such trading would be 
practicable.
47
 The final statement undermines much of the case law relating to mutual 
recognition. In the Foie Gras case
48
 it was emphasised that trust between Member 
States as to domestic regulation was paramount, and that as such only foie gras „so 
different in content as to give rise to suspicion of deceit‟49 would entitle protective 
State measures to be taken. In PrussenElektra the ECJ clearly sought to encourage 
and promote renewable energy and environmental concern. As such Treaty provisions 
appeared to be somewhat manipulated, and the applied test of proportionality was a 
weak one. Jacobs AG questioned whether the court should go further and expressly 
acknowledge that environmental protection was now an Article 36 derogation.
50
 The 
ability of the court to arrive at what it felt to be the correct conclusion, in spite of 
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Treaty provisions and a legacy of case law suggesting differently, marks both the 
ECJ‟s commitment to environmental issues and its willingness find a means of acting 
to protect legislation it feels holds value. There is an internal balance, and Article 3(5) 
TEU could provide the external balance. This would benefit all - including advocates 
of international law - for at current international law is avoided due to its potential to 
overwhelm. Few things in life are ever perfect; compromise is needed and this is the 
“Case” to begin. 
 
